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Note
TO EACH HIS OWN JURY: DUAL JURIES IN JOINT TRIALS
KAITLIN A. CANTY
This Note explores the dual jury system in which each defendant in a
joint trial has his or her own jury to decide guilt or innocence. In 1968, in
Bruton v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled that despite any limiting
instruction, a defendant’s right to confrontation is violated when an
incriminating out-of-court confession is admitted against him when the
confesser does not testify. This decision called into question courts’ ability
to try defendants jointly. Shortly thereafter, courts began impaneling two
juries simultaneously to decide the guilt or innocence of each defendant.
This procedure was first approved by the federal courts in 1972 and has
continued to withstand defendant challenges for nearly four decades. In
addition to remedying the dilemma stemming from Bruton, impaneling
dual juries also is a way to promote judicial economy and grant partial
severance based on antagonistic defenses. Many courts, however, are
reluctant to endorse the procedure despite their affirmation of convictions
of defendants tried by dual juries. This Note argues that courts should
endorse the dual jury trial procedure. It also urges the adoption of
detailed guidelines to assist judges in implementing the dual jury practice
and proposes a model of such guidelines.
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TO EACH HIS OWN JURY: DUAL JURIES IN JOINT TRIALS
KAITLIN A. CANTY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Article III of the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he Trial
of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury.”1 The
Sixth Amendment of the Constitution requires that criminal defendants
“shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of
the State.”2 The Supreme Court has recognized that the right to a jury has
grown to be a “deep commitment of the Nation . . . in serious criminal
cases.”3 Certainly, Americans consider trial by jury an essential freedom
of citizenship and a check on government power.4 Perhaps because this
right is so ingrained in society, proposed changes to the current system risk
being met with stark criticism. Reforms are often necessary, however, in
order to achieve the dual goals of preserving defendants’ rights and
ensuring speedy trials.5
One such innovation to trial by jury is the multiple jury system in
which each defendant in a joint trial has his or her own jury. The
procedure was used as early as 1914 in a California Court of Appeal case
in which two defendants were convicted of murder.6 There, in response to
defendants’ request for separate trials, the court simultaneously impaneled
two separate juries.7 The defense counsel expressly stated in court that he
did not object to the procedure, and as a result the appeals court refused to
hear any argument that the defendants’ motion for a separate trial was
denied or that they were prejudiced by the dual juries.8
This so-called “experiment”9 of simultaneous juries was first examined
* Union College, B.A. 2008; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2011. I
would like to thank the editors and members of the Connecticut Law Review for their suggestions
during the editing process. This Note is dedicated to my parents, Karen and Ed, for their unending and
unwavering love and support throughout all my endeavors. All errors contained herein are mine alone.
1
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
2
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (holding that the right to trial by jury is also
applicable to state courts via the Fourteenth Amendment).
4
Id. at 155 (“A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to prevent oppression
by the Government.”).
5
See Byrne v. Matczak, 254 F.2d 525, 528–29 (3d Cir. 1958) (“[T]he constitutional conception of
jury trial is not inflexible in all details, so long as the essential elements of the institution are
preserved.”); see also Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 102–03 (1970) (holding that a six-member jury
did not violate defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment).
6
People v. Ho Kim You, 141 P. 950, 951 (Cal. Ct. App. 1914).
7
Id. at 954.
8
Id. at 954–55.
9
United States v. Sidman, 470 F.2d 1158, 1168 (9th Cir. 1972).
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by the federal courts in 1972 in United States v. Sidman. In Sidman, the
Ninth Circuit heard a challenge by a defendant that his dual jury trial
denied him due process.11 In unanimously upholding the defendant’s
conviction and the use of two juries,12 the court found that the defendant’s
rights were preserved, but it also cautioned that its holding should not be
construed as “a blanket endorsement” of the procedure.13 Nearly forty
years have passed since the Sidman court upheld multiple juries as
consistent with due process. Since then, both federal14 and state15 courts
have heard challenges to the procedure and have overwhelmingly affirmed
defendants’ convictions. Many courts, however, are still reluctant to
endorse dual juries16 and little literature has been written on the practice
over the last four decades.17
10

Id. at 1167–70.
Id. at 1169.
12
Id. at 1160, 1170.
13
Id. at 1170.
14
On the federal level, in addition to the Ninth Circuit, the First, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh,
and D.C. Circuits have also affirmed convictions of defendants tried by the use of multiple juries. See
Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1100 (10th Cir. 2008); Brown v. Sirmons, 515 F.3d 1072, 1077–79
(10th Cir. 2008); Padilla v. Dorsey, No. 00-2043, 2000 WL 1089502, at *1 (10th Cir. Aug. 4, 2000);
Mack v. Peters, 80 F.3d 230, 235, 238 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Lebron-Gonzalez, 816 F.2d
823, 830–31 (1st Cir. 1987); United States v. Lewis, 716 F.2d 16, 18–21 (D.C. Cir. 1983); United
States v. Hayes, 676 F.2d 1359, 1366–67 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Rimar, 558 F.2d 1271,
1273 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Rowan, 518 F.2d 685, 689–90 (6th Cir. 1975).
15
See generally Fern L. Kletter, Annotation, Propriety of Use of Multiple Juries at Joint Trial of
Multiple Defendants in State Criminal Prosecution, 41 A.L.R.6th 295 (2009) (collecting state cases).
16
The majority of criticism comes from state courts. See, e.g., State v. Scroggins, 716 P.2d 1152,
1155 (Idaho 1985) (“While we conclude that the use of the dual jury system in the present case does
not pose grounds for reversal, the potential for serious error in a complicated case may caution against
its use.”); People v. Church, 429 N.E.2d 577, 584 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (finding the two jury system not
“particularly attractive”); Scarborough v. State, 437 A.2d 672, 676 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981)
(“strongly condemning the use of dual juries”); Ewish v. State, 871 P.2d 306, 313 (Nev. 1994)
(rejecting an optimistic view of multiple juries and expressing that they can be “a breeding ground for
confusion”); State v. Corsi, 430 A.2d 210, 213 (N.J. 1981) (concluding that “there are too many
opportunities for reversible error to take place” and therefore refusing to recommend it); People v.
Ricardo B., 535 N.E.2d 1336, 1339 (N.Y. 1989) (expressing reservations and recommending multiple
juries “to be used sparingly and then only after a full consideration of the impact the procedure will
have on defendants’ due process rights”); Wilson v. State, 983 P.2d 448, 458 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998)
(“[W]e would be remiss if we did not caution the trial courts in Oklahoma to bear in mind that the dual
jury procedure has the potential for engendering error, especially in complex cases.”), aff’d in part and
vacated in part by Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1070 (10th Cir. 2008).
17
The few articles that have been published on dual juries are relatively brief as well. See Alex
A. Gaynes, Two Juries/One Trial—Panacea of Judicial Economy or Personification of Murphy’s Law,
5 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 285, 285–292 (1981) (discussing general background of the dual jury
procedure and profiling United States v. Hanigan, 681 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir. 1982), to show potential
errors); Adam Hersh, Joint Criminal Trials with Multiple Juries: Why They Are Used and Suggested
Ways to Implement Them, FLA. BAR J., Apr. 1999, at 72, 72–74 (discussing a general background of
multiple jury trials and Florida’s use of the procedure); Judson W. Morris & Robert E. Savitt, Bruton
Revisited—One Trial/Two Juries, PROSECUTOR, Nov.–Dec. 1976, at 92, 92–94 (discussing general
background of dual juries and profiling a Los Angeles Superior Court case using dual juries); Marie G.
Santagata, One Trial, Two Juries—It Works in Extraordinary Cases, N.Y. L.J., May 11, 1988, at 1, 32
(reporting that the expected benefits of the dual jury system, including reduced burden on witnesses,
reduced costs, and an efficient use of the court’s time, were all realized in People v. Ricardo B., 535
11

2010]

DUAL JURIES IN JOINT TRIALS

325

This Note argues that both state and federal courts should endorse dual
jury trials and cease condemning the practice while simultaneously
upholding convictions by multiple juries. This Note will show the
advantages of the procedure. Dual juries are well tested in court, having
withstood multiple defendants’ arguments over the last four decades. To
ease the transition to more uniform endorsement, each jurisdiction that has
upheld convictions of defendants tried by multiple juries should adopt
detailed guidelines, such as those in this Note, and incorporate them into
their rules.
Part II provides a broad overview of the dual jury system, including the
various contexts in which dual juries have been employed, the authority
courts have cited for impaneling dual juries, the standard of review courts
have used to examine challenges to the practice, and rationales courts have
advanced for using the procedure. Part III argues that the advantages of
the dual jury system outweigh the disadvantages, and accordingly, courts
should move toward embracing multiple juries in the appropriate contexts.
Several arguments frequently raised by defendants against dual juries and
courts’ responses to these challenges will be examined. This Part
demonstrates that the procedure has been extensively tested in the courts
and defendants’ challenges have been overwhelmingly rejected. Part IV
proposes detailed model guidelines that jurisdictions using multiple juries
should adopt in order to achieve the appropriate balance between judicial
economy and defendants’ rights. Finally, Part V concludes with a brief
summary of why more courts should impanel dual juries.
II. THE DUAL JURY SYSTEM EXPLORED
The decisional authority reviewing dual juries is substantially greater
in the criminal context, but recently one circuit has approved the use of
dual juries in the civil context.18 Moreover, when faced with a motion to
impanel dual juries, a court traditionally must evaluate two considerations.
First, a court must determine whether it has authority to order dual juries.
Second, a court must decide what standard of review to use. In addition to
examining these considerations, this Part concludes by discussing
rationales for implementing the procedure.
A. Contexts in Which Dual Juries Have Been Impaneled
Dual juries were first upheld by the federal circuit in 1972 in United
N.E.2d 1336 (N.Y. 1989)); Note, Richardson v. Marsh: Codefendant Confessions and the Demise of
Confrontation, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1876, 1890–94 (1988) (discussing the benefits and procedural
considerations of impaneling dual juries); Note, On the Joint Trial of Two Defendants, the Empanelling
of Two Juries Simultaneously is Permissible, 2 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 407, 407–17 (1974) (providing a
general background of dual juries and profiling United States v. Sidman).
18
In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 361 F.3d 439, 441 (7th Cir. 2004).
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States v. Sidman. In Sidman, both codefendants were convicted of armed
robbery.20 The first state court case that could be found after 1972 to
uphold the procedure was decided by the District Court of Appeal of
Florida in 1978.21 In Feeney v. State,22 the court affirmed a defendant’s
conviction of robbery by use of a firearm by a dual jury trial—even in the
absence of cited authority to conduct the procedure—because the record
did not indicate prejudice and there was substantial overlap in the evidence
against both defendants.23 Further, the court noted that the law was
evolutionary in nature and dual juries support this idea.24 Finally, the court
noted the broad discretion that trial judges hold over their courts.25 That
same year, the Superior Court of New Jersey found no prejudice in the
“unorthodox” procedure of three juries in one trial and upheld a conviction
of conspiracy to commit robbery, armed robbery, and assault with intent to
rob while armed.26 Other states followed in upholding convictions based
on the procedure over the next three years.27 All of these cases were
criminal cases—the predominant context in which dual juries are used by
courts.
Recently, the Seventh Circuit addressed the issue of whether a court
may impanel multiple juries in a civil trial. The matter arose when direct
purchasers of high fructose corn syrup brought a class action suit against
the principal manufacturers of the product alleging a price fixing
conspiracy in violation of Section One of the Sherman Act.28 The district
court expressed its view that dual juries were favored in the case due to
concerns over judicial economy and because limiting instructions would be
19

470 F.2d 1158, 1170 (9th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 1160.
Feeney v. State, 359 So. 2d 569, 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). In 1975, the Supreme Court of
Louisiana denied the state’s motion for a dual jury to resolve the dilemma where defendants were
allowed to choose which state constitution to be tried under and each chose a different one. State v.
Thomas, 319 So. 2d 789, 792–93 (La. 1975). The court there declined to impanel dual juries even
when failing to do so resulted in severance in defiance of Louisiana’s Code of Criminal Procedure. Id.
at 793. The court “fe[lt] that [the procedure] would cause numerous other complications,” but did not
provide any explanation of which “complications” they feared would occur. Id.
22
359 So. 2d 569 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
23
Id. at 570.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
State v. Hernandez, 394 A.2d 883, 884–85 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978).
27
See, e.g., People v. Wardlow, 173 Cal. Rptr. 500, 505 (Ct. App. 1981) (finding no prejudice and
affirming defendant’s conviction for two counts of robbery and one count of murder in the second
degree); People v. Church, 429 N.E.2d 577, 585 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (finding authorization for the two
jury procedure and affirming defendant’s conviction of murder and armed violence); Scarborough v.
State, 437 A.2d 672, 676 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981) (finding no reversible error and thus upholding
defendant’s conviction for robbery); People v. Brooks, 285 N.W.2d 307, 307–08 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979)
(approving the dual jury procedure and upholding conviction for breaking and entering); State v. Corsi,
430 A.2d 210, 210–11, 213 (N.J. 1981) (finding no reversible error and affirming a conviction of
conspiracy to commit robbery, armed robbery with a dangerous instrument, murder, and, with respect
to one defendant, atrocious assault and battery).
28
In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 361 F.3d 439, 440 (7th Cir. 2004).
20
21
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insufficient to overcome prejudicial evidence admissible against only one
defendant.29 The court, unsure of its authority to impanel dual juries in
antitrust cases, certified the question to the circuit court.30 Writing for a
unanimous Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner31 held that there was no bar to
the practice and even encouraged it: “Imaginative procedures for averting
jury error, as long as they do not violate any legal norm, are to be
encouraged rather than discouraged.”32 Further, the court found the
procedure to be “orthodox in criminal cases” and could not identify any
reason why it should be met with disapproval in the civil context.33 This
case has yet to be cited by other civil cases, but one state court has cited it
in a criminal case to provide support for a trial court judge’s inherent
discretion to impanel dual juries.34 Moreover, at least one state court has
expressed approval of dual juries in civil suits.35
B. Authority to Order Dual Juries
One of the most common arguments made by defendants against
multiple juries is that courts lack the authority to employ them.36 Courts
offer several explanations for rejecting this claim. Most are rooted in
procedural rules, but some courts have also advanced policy reasons.
Many courts have found that authority for dual juries lies in their
classification as a partial form of severance.37 Courts have held that the
29

In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 303 F. Supp. 2d 971, 973 (C.D. Ill. 2004).
Id. at 973–74.
31
Judge Posner also wrote the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Smith v. DeRobertis, 758 F.2d 1151,
1151 (7th Cir. 1985), in which the court held that dual juries do not violate the due process clause. Id.
at 1152.
32
High Fructose Corn Syrup, 361 F.3d at 441.
33
Id. For a discussion of the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in High Fructose Corn Syrup, see
generally Todd Lochner, Legal Note, Impaneling Multiple Juries in Civil Suits, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 226
(2005).
34
Woolbright v. State, 160 S.W.3d 315, 324 (Ark. 2004). For further discussion of Woolbright,
see Ralph Quanah Stewart, Annual Survey of Caselaw: Criminal Law, 27 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.
REV. 701, 707–09 (2005).
35
Ford v. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co., 476 S.E.2d 565, 568 (Ga. 1996) (holding that the dual jury
procedure was governed by statutory authority).
36
See, e.g., People v. Wardlow, 173 Cal. Rptr. 500, 502 (Ct. App. 1981) (rejecting defendants’
argument that the trial court exceeded its statutory authority in impaneling two juries); People v. Trice,
577 N.E.2d 1195, 1203 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (finding no merit in defendant’s argument that the trial
court was not authorized to permit dual juries since Illinois courts have sanctioned the procedure); State
v. Bowman, 588 A.2d 728, 732 (Me. 1991) (rejecting defendant’s argument that there is no statutory
authorization for a dual-trial four-jury procedure); Alverson v. State, 983 P.2d 498, 506 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1999) (rejecting defendant’s argument that Oklahoma law precluded the court from using dual
juries).
37
See United States v. Rowan, 518 F.2d 685, 689–90 (6th Cir. 1975) (noting that the district court
granted severance but impaneled two juries); People v. Hana, 524 N.W.2d 682, 693 (Mich. 1994)
(finding that the use of dual juries is a partial form of severance); People v. Ricardo B., 535 N.E.2d
1336, 1338 (N.Y. 1989) (concluding that “the use of multiple juries is merely a partial form of
severance” and citing other courts that have reasoned the same); State v. Avery, 571 N.W.2d 907, 909
(Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (agreeing with the State’s argument that “because a single trial to multiple juries
30
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same purpose of, and protection provided by, severance is preserved in the
multiple jury system.38 The primary purpose of severance is to avoid
confusion over which evidence applies to which defendant. In a dual jury
trial conducted correctly, each jury only hears evidence applicable to its
respective defendant. In addition, when one codefendant makes an out-ofcourt confession incriminating another codefendant, but then refuses to
testify, the latter defendant’s right to confrontation is implicated. This is
because the codefendant who has been incriminated cannot then confront
his accuser—his codefendant—since that codefendant does not take the
stand. Severance thus preserves defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights in
such scenarios.39 Because total severance is within the sound discretion of
the trial judge,40 it follows that partial severance is also within the court’s
discretion.
An alternative source of authority for multiple juries stems from
federal rules and many states’ procedural rules providing whatever relief
justice requires in joint trials. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
permit the court to sever defendants’ trials—or “provide any other relief
that justice requires”41—if there is prejudice from joinder. Some state
rules also have such a clause.42 In fact, this provision has also been used
by a state court to approve the use of four juries in a dual trial.43 A state’s
ability to use this provision, however, would depend upon the language of
the rule.44
Another way that courts authorize multiple juries is by citing the
traditional preference for joint trials and that impaneling dual juries
preserves this practice. Rule 8(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure allows joinder of defendants if both defendants “are alleged to
have participated in the same act or transaction, or in the same series of
45
acts or transactions, constituting an offense or offenses.” States’ rules of

provides the individual defendants with the same protection they receive in separate trials, the dual jury
trial should be considered a form of severance”).
38
See, e.g., Avery, 571 N.W.2d at 909.
39
See discussion infra Part II.D (discussing avoidance of the Bruton problem as a rationale for
permitting dual juries).
40
FED. R. CRIM. P. 14(a).
41
Id.
42
See, e.g., ME. R. CRIM. P. 8(d) (authorizing the court to “provide whatever . . . relief justice
requires”); see also People v. Church, 429 N.E.2d 577, 584 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (finding statutory
authority for a dual jury joint trial in the state’s code of criminal procedure that grants courts discretion
to “provide any other relief as justice may require” in the face of prejudice to the defendant).
43
State v. Bowman, 588 A.2d 728, 733 (Me. 1991).
44
In State v. Avery, for example, the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin cited the State’s argument in
the alternative that the dual jury procedure was authorized by “other relief justice requires” in a state
statute. 571 N.W.2d 907, 909 n.3 (Wis. 1997). The court, however, acknowledged the defendant’s
counterargument that the language of the statute did not appear to provide this authorization where
mandatory severance was required in the case of a codefendant’s confession. Id.
45
FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b).
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criminal procedure also explicitly provide for joint trials. Whether to try
defendants accused of crimes arising from the same transaction together or
separately is within the discretion of the trial court,47 and generally, courts
have expressed a preference for joint trials of codefendants.48 Further, the
Supreme Court has recognized the “vital role”49 that joinder plays in the
criminal justice system: joint trials “conserve state funds, diminish
inconvenience to witnesses and public authorities, and avoid delays in
bringing those accused of crime to trial.”50
Dual juries are particularly favored when there is admissible evidence
against one defendant that is inadmissible against the other defendant.51
The procedure allows the removal of the defendant’s jury against whom
the evidence is inadmissible. Accordingly, the evidence against each
defendant is exactly the same as the evidence would have been had the
defendants been tried separately.52 This admissibility difficulty is known
as the “Bruton” problem and is discussed below.53
Finally, courts have found authority to impanel dual juries in the
inherent discretion vested in courts to address increasing case loads on
their dockets and have looked favorably upon innovative efforts to do so.
When the Ninth Circuit first upheld dual juries in 1972, it cited the Third
Circuit’s reasoning in a case holding that the decision of whether to allow
dispersal of a jury while deliberation on the verdict is in progress is within
the discretion of the trial judge: “[F]air new procedures, which tend to
facilitate proper fact finding, are allowable, although not traditional.”54
This has been the foundation for other courts’ reasoning that their

46

See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 13.3(b), (c); ME. R. CRIM. P. 8(c); see also State v. Anderson, 409
A.2d 1290, 1297 (Me. 1979) (noting that “joint trials are generally favored in the interest of conserving
judicial resources, avoiding duplicative trials, minimizing the public expenditure of funds and promptly
bringing the accused to trial”).
47
Wayne R. LaFave et al., Court’s Authority to Consolidate and Sever, 5 CRIM. PROC. § 17.3(a)
(3d ed. 2009).
48
See Carr v. Warren, No. 05-CV-73763-DT, 2007 WL 2389816, at *7 (E.D. Mich. July 9, 2007)
(citing that courts favor joint trials); State v. VanHorn, No. L-98-1171, 2000 WL 234557, at *6 (Ohio
Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2000) (“The trial court’s sua sponte order [to impanel dual juries for the codefendants]
recognized that the joinder of defendants is the rule rather than the exception because the law favors
avoiding multiple trials.”).
49
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 209 (1987).
50
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 134 (1968); see also Robert O. Dawson, Joint Trials of
Defendants in Criminal Cases: An Analysis of Efficiencies and Prejudices, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1379,
1381–97 (1979) (discussing the efficiencies and other benefits of joint trials).
51
See infra note 80 (noting that both federal and state jurisdictions have used multiple juries to
remedy Bruton problems).
52
See State v. Avery, 571 N.W.2d 907, 910 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (concluding that the evidence
before the defendant’s jury at his dual jury trial was exactly what it would have been had he had his
own trial).
53
See discussion infra Part II.D.
54
United States v. Sidman, 470 F.2d 1158, 1168 (9th Cir. 1972) (quoting Byrne v. Matczak, 254
F.2d 525, 529 (3d Cir. 1958)).
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discretion encompasses the use of multiple juries. As one Florida state
judge wrote, “[t]he law is, and must be, dynamic and not static. Procedural
law is no exception.”56 Such “flexibility and discretion”57 afforded to
judges benefits the judicial process. Dual juries—it has been concluded—
are merely a case-by-case “‘exercise of an individual judge’s discretion to
use a particular technique in order to meet a specific problem.’”58 At least
one state appellate court has even upheld the dual jury procedure when
ordered by the judge sua sponte, finding that “it is fundamental that the
trial court may control its own docket and courtroom proceedings.”59
C. Standard of Review
Since many courts find that impaneling dual juries is a form of partial
severance,60 they apply the standard of review for severance to dual jury
trials. Reviewing courts evaluate whether there has been “identifiable
prejudice or ‘gross unfairness . . . such as to deprive the defendant of a fair
trial or due process of law.’”61 All federal circuits that have evaluated the
dual jury procedure have held that it is not a per se violation of due
process.62 Rather, courts require a showing of specific prejudice and have
held that a generalized claim of prejudice is not sufficient to prove
deprivation of rights.63 The Seventh Circuit has gone further in requiring a
showing of specific and undue prejudice to the defendant from the use of
multiple juries.64 In assessing whether there has been prejudice, courts
look to whether juries were confused or were unable to render their verdict
fairly and whether the trial court adequately instructed the juries about

55
See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 610 F. Supp. 568, 571 (D.P.R. 1985); People v. Brooks,
285 N.W.2d 307, 309 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979).
56
Feeney v. State, 359 So. 2d 569, 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
57
Hedlund v. Sheldon, 840 P.2d 1008, 1009 (Ariz. 1992).
58
Id. at 1011 (quoting State v. Lambright, 673 P.2d 1, 16 (Ariz. 1983) (Feldman, J., concurring)).
59
State v. VanHorn, No. L-98-1171, 2000 WL 234557, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2000).
60
See supra text accompanying notes 37–40 (discussing the authority for dual juries as stemming
from courts’ power to sever cases).
61
People v. Cummings, 850 P.2d 1, 35 (Cal. 1993) (alteration in original) (quoting People v.
Turner, 690 P.2d 669, 675 (Cal. 1984), overruled on other grounds by People v. Anderson, 742 P.2d
1306, 1309 (Cal. 1987)); see also People v. Hana, 524 N.W.2d 682, 693 (Mich. 1994) (“The dual-jury
procedure should be scrutinized with the same concern in mind that tempers a severance motion, i.e.,
whether it has prejudiced the substantial rights of the defendant.”).
62
See supra note 14 (citing circuit court cases that have affirmed convictions of defendants tried
by the use of double juries); see also State v. Padilla, 964 P.2d 829, 832 (N.M. Ct. App. 1998) (noting
that “[n]o other jurisdiction has determined that severance by using dual juries is per se prejudicial”).
63
See United States v. Hayes, 676 F.2d 1359, 1366 (11th Cir. 1982) (finding that appellants had
not alleged “any more than a generalized possibility of harm”); People v. Knight, 486 N.E.2d 1356,
1361 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (upholding a triple-jury procedure when defendant failed to allege any
specific prejudice).
64
Smith v. DeRobertis, 758 F.2d 1151, 1152 (7th Cir. 1985).
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65

their role. In applying this standard, the vast majority of courts have
upheld convictions,66 even while criticizing the practice.67
D. Rationales Provided for Impaneling Dual Juries
There are three reasons courts have impaneled dual juries. The first is
to avoid the so-called Bruton problem when a defendant makes an out-ofcourt statement about one of his or her codefendants and the defendant
who made the confession does not testify. The second is to grant partial
severance based on antagonistic defenses. The third is to promote judicial
economy.
During the joint trial of defendants Evans and Bruton—both accused
of armed postal robbery—a postal inspector testified that Evans had
confessed that he and Bruton committed the robbery.68 At the end of the
government’s case, the trial judge instructed the jury that the postal
inspector’s testimony was admissible against only Evans and not Bruton
since it was hearsay, explaining that “[a] confession made outside of court
by one defendant may not be considered as evidence against the other
defendant, who was not present and in no way a party to the confession.”69
Both Evans and Bruton were convicted.70 On appeal, the circuit court set
aside Evans’s conviction, finding that the confession should not have been
admitted against him.71 Conversely, Bruton’s conviction was affirmed.72
In so holding, the circuit court relied on the trial judge’s limiting
instruction to the jury to disregard the hearsay testimony.73 Bruton
appealed and the U.S. Supreme Court reversed his conviction, holding that
despite the judge’s instruction, the incrimination “posed a substantial threat
to [Bruton’s] right to confront the witnesses against him [guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment] . . . . The effect [wa]s the same as if there had been no
instruction at all.”74
65
See, e.g., People v. Mack, 606 N.E.2d 165, 171 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (finding no indication of
confusion or unfairness in the jury’s decision and concluding that the trial judge’s instructions were
adequate).
66
See supra note 14 (citing cases that have upheld convictions, finding no prejudice).
67
See supra note 16 (citing cases that have upheld convictions, yet criticized the use of dual
juries); cf. People v. Brown, 624 N.E.2d 1378, 1389 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that defendant was
prejudiced by dual juries when testimony and closing argument confused portions of one defendant’s
confession with his codefendant’s confession); People v. Garcia, 754 N.Y.S.2d 138, 140 (Sup. Ct.
2002) (holding that the potential benefits of multiple juries were outweighed by the potential prejudice
and thus denying the State’s application for a multiple jury trial); State v. Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d 458,
468 (Tenn. 2002) (expressly refusing to condone dual juries in Tennessee and finding no abuse of
discretion when the trial court denied dual jury trial).
68
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 124 (1968).
69
Id. at 125 n.2.
70
Id. at 124.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 124–25.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 137.
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This holding called into question the ability of courts to hold joint
trials. If a defendant did not testify, any out-of-court confessions she made
implicating other defendants would be inadmissible against her
codefendants and thus could not be heard by the jury at a joint trial. Three
solutions emerged to address this dilemma, which became known as the
Bruton problem. First, the court could completely exclude the confession
at the joint trial.75 A confession, however, is often valuable evidence, and
this option may come at the expense of the state’s ability to prove its case.
Second, the court may delete from the confession any references to the
codefendant against whom the confession is inadmissible.76 Unfortunately,
this can still lead to prejudice, particularly in the context of oral testimony.
The Supreme Court in Bruton addressed the inherent difficulty in these
circumstances:
Where the confession is offered in evidence by means of oral
testimony, redaction is patently impractical. To expect a
witness to relate X’s confession without including any of its
references to Y is to ignore human frailty. Again, it is
unlikely that an intentional or accidental slip by the witness
could be remedied by instructions to disregard.77
The third method to address a Bruton problem is to sever the
defendants’ trials.78 This ignores the preference for joint trials, however,
and can lead to inefficient usage of time and money due to unnecessary
duplication of much of the same evidence.
A few years after the Bruton ruling, a fourth option emerged that did
not require the prosecutor to forego using a defendant’s out-of-court
confession, delete any references, or waste time or money conducting two
separate trials; the court could order the defendants tried in a joint trial, but
by separate juries.79 In a multiple jury trial, only the jury that is
determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant who made the out-ofcourt statement is present when it is admitted to the court. This allows a
75
DONALD S. VOORHEES, MANUAL ON RECURRING PROBLEMS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 156
(Genevra Kay Loveland ed., 5th ed. 2001).
76
Id.
77
Bruton, 391 U.S. at 134 n.10 (quoting Note, Codefendants’ Confessions, 3 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 80, 88 (1967)); see also id. (citing cases where courts required deletions of references to
codefendants where practicable and law journal articles criticizing the efficacy of such deletions). The
holding in Bruton was further clarified by two subsequent Supreme Court rulings addressing redacted
confessions. In Richardson v. Marsh, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation
is not violated when a redaction eliminates any reference to a codefendant’s existence when paired with
a limiting instruction. 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987). In Gray v. Maryland, the Court held that redactions
replacing the defendant’s name with blank spaces or deletions violate Bruton because the jury will
almost certainly realize that the deletion refers to a codefendant and thus will know of the existence of
the defendant in relation to the confession. 523 U.S. 185, 192–95 (1998).
78
VOORHEES, supra note 75, at 156.
79
Id.
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joint trial but alleviates any need for redaction and insufficient limiting
instruction to a jury. In order to avoid a Bruton problem by using multiple
juries, however, the prosecution must anticipate beforehand whether it will
introduce testimony potentially contradictory to the holding in Bruton.
Nevertheless, prosecutors in criminal trials often have all the evidence
against defendants prior to a trial and thus should be able to make a motion
for multiple juries.80
The second rationale advanced for multiple juries is that the defendants
plan to present antagonistic defenses. Antagonistic defenses are present
“when one person’s claim of innocence is predicated solely on the guilt of
a co-defendant.”81 When multiple defendants are tried together, a
defendant has the right to request a severance if he believes his defense is
antagonistic to that of his codefendant to the extent that he would not
receive a fair trial.82 In a joint trial, a defendant has the added burden of
defending against both the government’s case and any accusatory aspect of
his codefendants’ statements.83 Dual juries alleviate this burden by
providing each defendant with a jury that has heard only the evidence
against him, and forces the prosecution to prove its case rather than
allowing the jury to “convict[] one defendant through the efforts of the
other.”84 It is important to note, however, that courts often differ in their
definitions of antagonistic defenses.85 Finger-pointing alone or mere
inconsistencies in defenses is usually insufficient; the defenses must be
mutually exclusive.86
80
See United States v. Lewis, 716 F.2d 16, 19 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (citing that the prosecutor sought
to introduce testimony against one of the codefendants that was inadmissible under Bruton and that the
court’s response was to hold a joint trial before two juries rather than sever the cases). Both federal and
state jurisdictions have used multiple juries to remedy Bruton problems. See, e.g., id.; People v.
Ricardo B., 535 N.E.2d 1336, 1337 (N.Y. 1989) (impaneling two juries over the objections of both the
People, who wanted a joint trial with one jury, and the defendants, who wanted total severance, in order
to remedy a Bruton problem).
81
Barron v. Renico, No. 04-CV-73788, 2006 WL 1663320, at *8 (E.D. Mich. June 13, 2006)
(quoting United States v. Harris, 9 F.3d 493, 501 (6th Cir. 1993)).
82
People v. Johnson, 594 N.E.2d 253, 261 (Ill. 1992) (upholding trial court’s decision to impanel
dual juries based on the antagonistic defenses of both defendants); see also Ricardo B., 535 N.E.2d at
1339 (N.Y. 1989) (finding cases involving antagonistic defenses as particularly attractive to employ
multiple juries).
83
Dawson, supra note 50, at 1422; see also People v. Brooks, 285 N.W.2d 307, 308 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1979) (reasoning that a joint trial allows a state to “‘pit[] one defendant against the other, each
trying to save himself at the detriment of the other’” (quoting People v. Hurst, 238 N.W.2d 6, 10 (Mich.
1976))).
84
Brooks, 285 N.W.2d at 308.
85
See Dawson, supra note 50, at 1423–26. See generally Michele Meyer McCarthy, Annotation,
Antagonistic Defenses as Ground for Separate Trials of Codefendants in State Homicide Offenses—
Applicable Standard and Extent of Antagonism Required, 24 A.L.R.6th 591 (2007) (discussing
differing applicable standards for determining whether antagonistic defenses warrant severance and the
extent of antagonism required under the applicable standard).
86
See Barron, 2006 WL 1663320, at *8 (“The mere fact that each defendant points the finger at
another is insufficient [to require severance]; the defendant must show that the antagonism confused
the jury” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Horton, 847 F.2d 313, 317 (6th Cir. 1988)));
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The final rationale proposed for using multiple juries is to advance
judicial economy, which is most often an underlying concern when dual
juries are used under one of the two foregoing rationales. The American
Bar Association87 and the Eleventh Circuit88 have endorsed the use of dual
juries for the purpose of promoting judicial economy. The Eleventh
Circuit reasoned: “Contrary to the stance of our appellants, who would
impugn such concerns for judicial economy as illegitimate, we applaud
innovative efforts to resolve the overwhelming obstacles facing trial
judges, particularly in the context of multi-defendant, multi-count cases.”89
Indeed, there was a savings of eighty-six pages of testimony transcript that
would have been repeated had there been two separate trials in the case
before the Eleventh Circuit.90 In the next section, the advantages of
impaneling dual juries, including the promotion of judicial economy, are
discussed further.
III. THE CASE FOR DUAL JURIES
This Part examines the many advantages to impaneling dual juries.
Courts’ concerns regarding the practice as well as defendants’ arguments
against the procedure are also discussed. The advantages clearly outweigh
any concerns expressed by courts, and as discussed, defendants’ arguments
have been rejected absent a showing of specific prejudice. Dual juries
have been challenged on numerous occasions by numerous defendants yet
courts continue to uphold the procedure.91 Courts should recognize the
strong legal foundation that dual juries have earned over the years and
should endorse the procedure for future cases.
A. Advantages
There are three advantages to using simultaneous juries during a joint
trial. The primary benefit is to promote judicial economy by saving time
and money of two trials and making it more convenient for witnesses to
testify. Second, some courts have found that dual juries reduce prejudice
against defendants present in traditional joint trials. Finally, where there
are victims, dual juries relieve the victims’ families of sitting through more
than one trial and allow the victim to testify only once.
22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 820 (2010) (discussing the varying degrees of antagonism necessary to
warrant severance).
87
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS 20 (2005), available
at www.abanet.org/juryprojectstandards/principles.pdf (“Dual juries also may be used in order to
promote judicial economy by presenting otherwise duplicative evidence in a single trial.”).
88
United States v. Hayes, 676 F.2d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir. 1982).
89
Id.
90
Id. at 1367 n.4.
91
See infra Part III.C (discussing courts’ overwhelming rejection of defendants’ arguments
against dual juries).
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Judicial economy is one of the predominant advantages that courts
have cited for impaneling dual juries. The procedure allows the court
system to realize the financial benefits of joint trials despite the need for
separate juries. The Supreme Court acknowledged in Bruton v. United
States that “[j]oint trials do conserve state funds, diminish inconvenience
to witnesses and public authorities, and avoid delays in bringing those
accused of crime to trial.”92 In order to realize these benefits, much of the
evidence should be the same.93 It is not clear that there is a percentage of
evidence that must overlap, but the charges against the defendants should
arise from the same transaction, and sources have quantified adequate
commonalities of evidence at seventy-five percent94 and ninety percent.95
Indeed, when a substantial majority of the evidence against all defendants
overlaps, dual juries preserve the preference for joinder and prevent
“needless duplication.”96 For instance, in the first New York state court
case to utilize dual juries, the court of appeals held that “[t]he risk of error
arising from the procedure was clearly outweighed by judicial economy”
when “the trial involved over 25 witnesses, five of them reconstruction
experts.”97
Avoiding unnecessary expenditures of time and money are significant
considerations,98 particularly in jurisdictions with large dockets, and should

92

391 U.S. 123, 134 (1968).
See McKinney v. Ryan, No. CV 03-774-PHX-DGC, 2009 WL 2432738, at *6 (D. Ariz. Aug.
10, 2009) (“Because virtually all of the other evidence appeared to be admissible against both
Petitioner and Hedlund, however, the judge ordered that dual juries would be impaneled to hear the
case.”); Carr v. Warren, No. 05-CV-73763-DT, 2007 WL 2389816, at *8 (E.D. Mich. July 9, 2007)
(“[Codefendants’] joint trial involved numerous witnesses and substantially identical evidence. To
hold two trials on these substantially identical cases would have been unnecessarily duplicative and
excessive.”); People v. Gholston, 464 N.E.2d 1179, 1191 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (“Because a substantial
portion of the State’s testimonial evidence proffered during the course of the proceedings was
admissible as against all of the defendants, two simultaneous jury trials were certainly preferrable [sic]
in the interests of judicial economy.”).
94
Court Grants Prosecution’s Motion for Dual Juries Given the Minimal Intrusion Dual Juries
Entails, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 27, 2007, at 25.
95
Thomas J. Prohaska, One Trial, Two Juries Proposed in Youth Home Slaying, BUFFALO NEWS,
Nov. 11, 2009, at B3.
96
Santagata, supra note 17, at 32; see also People v. Brooks, 285 N.W.2d 307, 308 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1979) (“Things have gone quite smoothly . . . . [Impaneling dual juries] has helped the Court,
assisted the Court in that where it has taken us four days, we have been able to handle it in a little over
two days.”).
97
People v. Ricardo B., 535 N.E.2d 1336, 1339 (N.Y. 1989); see also Santagata, supra note 17, at
32 (reporting that the expected benefits of the dual jury system, including reduced burden on witnesses,
reduced costs, and an efficient use of the court’s time, were all realized in People v. Ricardo B., 535
N.E.2d 1336 (N.Y. 1989)). Further, in one of the earliest state courts to examine dual juries, the Court
of Appeals of Michigan upheld a conviction of the defendant after the trial court ordered a dual jury “in
the interest of judicial economy.” Brooks, 285 N.W.2d at 307.
98
See, e.g., Hedlund v. Sheldon, 840 P.2d 1008, 1009 (Ariz. 1992) (“[J]udicial process benefits
from according flexibility and discretion to judges in their efforts to manage a large and complex
caseload.”); Ricardo B., 535 N.E.2d at 1339 (“In this day of massive caseloads and an overburdened
criminal justice system judicial economy is not a negligible consideration and joint trials with multiple
93
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not be dismissed as ancillary concerns. Indeed, the multiple jury system’s
innovative nature has been praised, especially in light of the U.S. Supreme
Court’s ostensibly open attitude toward new methods that address the
costliness of jury trials.99 Jury trials are particularly costly; in 1976, they
cost an estimated $3,000 per day100 and an estimate from 1999 puts the
figure at $5,000 a day.101 Because dual juries allow one trial where
traditionally there would be two, the procedure allows for substantial
savings.
Further, dual juries minimize the burden on witnesses. By preserving a
joint trial, witnesses need only be available for one trial and thus do not
have to lose as much time from employment; indeed, sometimes witnesses
are only available for one trial.102 Simultaneous juries also avoid the
tension and strain on witnesses of having to repeat their testimony at
separate trials103 and do not require witnesses to remember details as long
as they would if there were two trials.
A second reason for impaneling dual juries is that it may lessen
prejudice to defendants in joint trials where defendants advance
antagonistic defenses:
Where mutually antagonistic defenses are presented in a joint
trial, there is a heightened potential that a single jury may
convict one defendant, despite the absence of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, in order to rationalize the acquittal of
another. That dilemma is not presented to dual juries. Each
jury is concerned only with the culpability of one defendant;
juries have obvious attractions, particularly in cases involving Bruton problems or antagonistic
defenses.” (citation omitted)).
99
Smith v. DeRobertis, 758 F.2d 1151, 1152 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that the Supreme Court
previously upheld a six-person jury in a criminal case (citing Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 102–03
(1970))). Other courts have also expressed their approval of innovation. See Lambright v. Stewart,
191 F.3d 1181, 1184 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[M]any experiments lead to better and stronger institutions.”);
United States v. Hayes, 676 F.2d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir. 1982) (“[W]e applaud innovative efforts to
resolve the overwhelming obstacles facing trial judges, particularly in the context of multi-defendant,
multi-count cases.”).
100
Morris & Savitt, supra note 17, at 92.
101
Vin Suprynowicz, Jury Trials Too Costly . . . Or Just Too Hard to Control?, ENTER STAGE
RIGHT (Mar. 1999), http://www.enterstageright.com/archive/articles/0399jury.htm; see also Malaika
Fraley, Dual Juries Seated in West Contra Costa County Gang Murder, Conspiracy Trial, CONTRA
COSTA TIMES (Cal.), Oct. 27, 2010 (noting in 2010 that the cost of court staff and jury pay alone is
about $2,950 per day in one California courthouse).
102
See, e.g., Hersh, supra note 17, at 72 (noting that separate trials become “especially
problematic in cases with recalcitrant, hard-to-locate or petrified witnesses”); Court Grants
Prosecution’s Motion, supra note 94 (profiling People v. Bostick in which Justice Seth L. Marvin held
that dual juries posed a minimal intrusion when the People expected to call sixteen witnesses at trial,
four of whom would testify before both juries, and the People argued that they would only be able to
produce the witnesses in court once).
103
Santagata, supra note 17, at 32; see also Morris & Savitt, supra note 17, at 92 (“[T]he patience
of even the most cooperative witness will start to wear thin when they are told they must return once
more to testify at a second trial.”).
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thus, they both can find the defendants innocent or guilty
without the uneasiness of inconsistency that would be
presented to a single jury in a joint trial. The chance for
prejudice is therefore significantly lessened.104
Additionally, because a defendant’s jury is excused from the
courtroom when inadmissible and potentially inculpating statements are
made regarding the defendant, using dual juries reduces prejudice.105 The
American Bar Association has also advocated the use of dual juries in part
because they reduce the likelihood that juries will use evidence in an
impermissible way.106 In addition, in his dissent in Bruton v. United States,
Justice White emphasized that joint trials often prevent inconsistent
verdicts against “legally indistinguishable defendants.”107 He wrote that
codefendants often “strenuously jockey[]” to be tried first in order to avoid
the potential unfairness of varying outcomes.108 Dual juries prevent either
defendant from benefiting from the order in which they are tried. For
instance, one commentator has argued that dual juries prevent the second
defendant from realizing the advantages of having the first trial’s
transcript.109 In these ways, dual juries may make joint trials fairer.
Finally, where the crime has a victim, having one trial instead of two
may significantly lessen the emotional burden on the victim and the
victim’s family. A court in the district of Oklahoma recognized this
advantage in a murder case, even informing the juries that this was one of
the rationales for using dual juries.110 The American Bar Association has
also recognized that dual juries reduce the emotional burden on victims
who testify.111 Particularly in rape and murder cases, one trial is often
emotional,112 and utilizing dual juries enables a speedier outcome rather
than forcing families to undergo two trials. Further, like witnesses,
sometimes victims are only available to testify for a limited time. For
example, in a state court case in New Jersey, the appellate court found no
prejudice where three juries were impaneled in one trial because of a
104

People v. Hana, 524 N.W.2d 682, 696–97 (Mich. 1994).
See McKinney v. Ryan, No. CV 03-774-PHX-DGC, 2009 WL 2432738, at *7 (D. Ariz. Aug.
10, 2009) (concluding that “‘dual juries help[ed] assure . . . compartmentalization by keeping
dangerous evidence away from the ears of the jurors for the defendant to whom it does not apply’”
(alterations in original) (quoting Lambright v. Stewart, 191 F.3d 1181, 1186 (9th Cir. 1999))).
106
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE ABA PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY
TRIALS (AND COMMENTARY) 106 (2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/juryprojectstandards/
The_ABA_Principles_for_Juries_and_Jury_Trials.pdf.
107
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 143 (1968) (White, J., dissenting).
108
Id.
109
Santagata, supra note 17, at 32.
110
Brown v. Sirmons, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1281 (N.D. Okla. 2006), aff’d 515 F.3d 1072, 1077–
79 (10th Cir. 2008).
111
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 106, at 106.
112
See Hersh, supra note 17, at 72 (noting that separate trials and thus successive testimony can
lead to a victim’s inability to testify, particularly in sexual battery and child abuse cases).
105
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Bruton problem and because the elderly victim had traveled from Puerto
Rico to testify.113
B. Courts’ Concerns
Although dual juries have been impaneled for several decades and as
early as almost 100 years ago, courts are often reluctant to embrace the
practice. While courts have consistently upheld the practice, they have
also expressed reservations and identified what they perceive as
disadvantages to dual juries.
This Part explores three ostensible
disadvantages and analyzes their merits.
1. Potential Burdens
One of the problems that courts have discussed is the various burdens
that dual juries appear to place on defense counsel, court reporters, and
judges. The Tenth Circuit has asserted that dual juries impose an added
burden on defense counsel to ensure that no prejudicial evidence is entered
against other defendants, thus decreasing the attention attorneys pay to
their own clients.114 In order to prevent inadmissible evidence from being
presented, each defendant’s counsel must inform the court whenever he or
she is about to present evidence or a defense antagonistic to a codefendant
so that the court may remove the codefendant’s jury.115
Although this is an added burden in comparison to a traditional single
jury trial, as long as most of the evidence is the same, there should only be
a few instances where this would occur. Further, in the case before the
Tenth Circuit, as in most trials in which dual juries are impaneled, each
defendant was represented by his own attorney116 who was charged with
being watchful of potential prejudicial evidence against his own client.
Although counsel is required to guard against prejudice affecting other
defendants, the ultimate responsibility should be with the codefendant’s
counsel. While this is an additional consideration that defense counsel
must be cautious of, any harm to defendants is purely speculative and must
be assessed for prejudice on a case-by-case basis.117
Further, at least one court has commented on the effect of dual juries
on court reporters. A Michigan state court acknowledged that there is an
113

State v. Hernandez, 394 A.2d 883, 885 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978).
Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1099 (10th Cir. 2008); see also Brown v. Sirmons, 515
F.3d 1072, 1079 (10th Cir. 2008) (expressing concerns about the potential for dual juries to impose
“unique burdens” on defense counsel to anticipate the path of particular lines of questioning in order to
ensure that no inadmissible evidence against one codefendant is admitted in the presence of a
codefendant’s jury).
115
Brown, 515 F.3d at 1079 (noting that counsel had to inform the judge “when his questions
might lead to answers that would not be admissible in the codefendant’s trial”).
116
Wilson, 536 F.3d at 1098.
117
See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the potential for increased prejudice to defendants).
114
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added burden on court reporters to keep separate records of the
proceedings.118 Ultimately, the court found that this did not outweigh the
advantages of using dual juries and affirmed the defendant’s conviction.119
The most significant burden imposed by using dual juries falls on the
trial judge. The judge is charged with addressing potentially “burdensome
administrative problems in caring for the juries and maintaining proper
courtroom decorum.”120 He or she is charged with ensuring the proper
procedural safeguards so that a defendant’s right to a fair trial is not
infringed upon by using simultaneous juries. This includes providing the
jury with appropriate instructions and monitoring whether the proper jury
is present in the courtroom. Accordingly, appeals courts examine whether
the trial judge has taken great care in ensuring that nothing occurred during
the trial to deprive defendants of a fair trial.121 Essentially, the trial judge
can make or break the propriety of dual juries; while the burden is certainly
stronger on the judge, as long as he or she is willing to show extra care,
there is no inherent loss of rights to the defendant.
Some courts have expressed concern that these potential additional
burdens make dual juries unsuitable for capital trials.122 For example, the
Tenth Circuit worried that having to monitor potential prejudice against
codefendants “increases the already difficult job of the capital defense
lawyer.”123 In 1992, the Supreme Court of Arizona cautioned that courts
must be extra vigilant when employing any innovative technique in capital
118

People v. Brooks, 285 N.W.2d 307, 309 n.1 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979).
Id. at 309.
120
People v. Rainge, 445 N.E.2d 535, 550–51 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (quoting People v. Williams,
No. 51870, slip op. at 4–7 (Ill. Apr. 16, 1982)); see also Note, Richardson v. Marsh, supra note 17, at
1893 (noting that “the trial judge must take special care in handling the juries and defense counsel”).
121
See Brown v. Sirmons, 515 F.3d 1072, 1078 (10th Cir. 2008) (“The trial court was careful and
meticulous in its instructions.”); United States v. Hayes, 676 F.2d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating
that the record reflected that the trial judge was meticulous in instruction and procedural mechanisms to
keep the juries separated); United States v. Sidman, 470 F.2d 1158, 1168 (9th Cir. 1972) (“The Judge
was meticulous in explaining to the entire panel and to each jury that there would be two juries, one to
try the guilt or innocence of Sidman and the other to try the guilt or innocence of Clifford, and
instructed each jury not to talk to anyone about the trial and particularly not to talk to any of the other
jurors in the other case.”); People v. Gholston, 464 N.E.2d 1179, 1190–91 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (“The
record in the present case is replete with admonitions by the lower court to each jury that its sole
concern was the particular offender whose guilt or innocence they would eventually determine. The
experienced trial judge exercised great care and patience in stressing repeatedly the nature of each
jury’s responsibilities . . . . It is also readily apparent that the court exercised great caution in retiring
each jury when certain inculpatory evidence not relevant to its respective case was introduced.”);
People v. Smith, 419 N.E.2d 404, 409 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (“[T]he record discloses that the trial court
thoroughly prepared the jurors for the procedure.”).
122
In capital cases, two juries are sometimes impaneled in a different context than to try multiple
defendants, which is the focus of this paper. One jury is used to determine the guilt or innocence of the
defendant and a separate jury is impaneled to impose a sentence. This method of employing multiple
juries is outside the scope of this paper. For a brief examination of dual juries in this context, see Kyle
Wackenheim, State v. Fry: Reconsidering Death-Qualification in New Mexico Capital Trials, 38 N.M.
L. REV. 627, 649–52 (2008).
123
Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1099 (10th Cir. 2008).
119
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cases. It also held, however, that approval of dual juries by the Supreme
Court of Arizona was not required,125 thus partially overruling a previous
case that held that capital cases are not appropriate for
“experimentation”126 such as the use of simultaneous juries.
Although capital cases carry the potential for the death penalty in some
cases, such instances are not inherently different from a constitutional
standpoint. The Ninth Circuit127 held that any potential unreliability as a
result of impaneling dual juries is not related to whether a capital crime is
involved:
Whatever additional constitutional constraints exist on the
use of dual juries in capital trials would be a consequence of
the greater reliability demanded of verdicts upon which a
sentence of death is based, and not upon any additional
uncertainty created by the fact that the trial is capital in
nature.128
Further, the Ninth Circuit expressly overruled any suggestion from
previous rulings that there is a constitutional barrier to the use of dual
juries in capital cases.129 This ruling drew a heated dissent from Judge
Reinhardt, who argued that the potential for death changes the
constitutional landscape and that dual juries have not been thoroughly
Accordingly, Judge Reinhardt argued such experimental
tested.130
measures should not be used in capital cases where the potential penalty is
so harsh.131 He was the lone dissenter, however, and as the Tenth Circuit
has asserted, most of the purported dangers potentially present when using
dual juries in capital cases are also possible risks associated with all joint
trials.132
2. An Inherent Risk of Prejudice?
Another potential problem with dual juries is that the risk of prejudice
is inherently too high. The Supreme Court of Bronx County New York
expressed concern about the potential prejudice stemming from a failure to
124

Hedlund v. Sheldon, 840 P.2d 1008, 1011 (Ariz. 1992).
Id.
126
State v. Lambright, 673 P.2d 1, 8 (Ariz. 1983), overruled in part by Hedlund, 840 P.2d at
1011.
127
Note that the Ninth Circuit was the first circuit to examine the dual jury procedure in United
States v. Sidman, 470 F.2d 1158, 1167–70 (9th Cir. 1972).
128
Beam v. Paskett, 3 F.3d 1301, 1304 (9th Cir. 1993), overruled on other grounds by Lambright
v. Stewart, 191 F.3d 1181, 1187 (9th Cir. 1999).
129
Lambright, 191 F.3d at 1187.
130
Id. at 1187–88 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
131
Id. at 1188.
132
Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1099 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[M]any of the potential harms
from a dual jury procedure, including the inadvertent introduction of prejudicial evidence against one
defendant, are also present and possibly magnified in a trial where the defendants are tried jointly.”).
125
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anticipate when a defendant’s jury needs to be excused and of the “everlooming risk” that an impermissible statement will be made in the presence
of the wrong jury.133 A few other courts, particularly state courts, have
expressed similar reluctance about the procedure.134 This is precisely the
type of speculative reasoning, however, that has been rejected by circuit
courts and other state courts in a demand to show specific prejudice.135
Courts have even identified the reduction of prejudice that dual juries have
achieved.136 Nevertheless, courts considering whether to grant a motion
for a dual jury trial should weigh factors that may increase this risk, such
as how many times each jury needs to be excluded from the courtroom.
Dual juries have been impaneled for several decades across numerous
jurisdictions and verdicts have been overturned for prejudice only a
handful of times.137 In fact, in 1999, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that “we
now know that dual juries are in wide use and that they have worked out
just fine.”138 The Ninth Circuit also found that any potential problems are
not inevitable in dual juries.139 Accordingly, all federal circuits that have
considered the procedure have upheld its constitutionality absent specific
indicia of prejudice.140 The First Circuit has even stated that “[a] defendant
carries the heavy burden of making a strong showing of prejudice.”141
Further, as argued above,142 dual juries help to lessen the prejudice that is
present in joint trials143 and thus preserve the Supreme Court’s preference
133

People v. Garcia, 754 N.Y.S.2d 138, 140–41 (Sup. Ct. 2002).
See supra note 16 (citing cases expressing reservations about the use of dual juries).
See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 716 F.2d 16, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (rejecting the argument that
it is “impossible to identify any specific prejudice because the prejudice is to be found in the subjective
response of the jury” and finding this argument to be mere “idle speculation” that is insufficient to
warrant the “extraordinary relief” of overturning a jury’s verdict); State v. Padilla, 964 P.2d 829, 833
(N.M. Ct. App. 1998) (“The prejudice at issue must be both actual, not based on pure conjecture, and
substantial in its impact on the defense. Prejudice, though conceivable, remains speculative unless
there is appreciable risk that the jury convicted the defendant for illegitimate reasons” (citation
omitted)).
136
See supra text accompanying notes 105–09 (discussing how dual juries reduce the risk of
prejudice).
137
See, e.g., People v. Brown, 624 N.E.2d 1378, 1389 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that the
defendant was prejudiced by dual juries when testimony and closing argument confused portions of one
defendant’s confession with his codefendant’s confession); Garcia, 754 N.Y.S.2d at 140 (holding that
the potential benefits of multiple juries were outweighed by the potential prejudice and thus denying
the State’s application for a multiple jury trial); see also State v. Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d 458, 468 (Tenn.
2002) (expressly refusing to condone dual juries in Tennessee and finding no abuse of discretion when
trial court denied dual jury trial).
138
Lambright v. Stewart, 191 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 1999).
139
Id. at 1185, 1186.
140
See, e.g., Mack v. Peters, 80 F.3d 230, 235 (7th Cir. 1996) (“For [a simultaneous trial of two
defendants in the same courtroom before two juries] to be unconstitutional, a defendant tried in such a
trial must show some specific, undue prejudice.”).
141
United States v. Lebron-Gonzalez, 816 F.2d 823, 831 (1st Cir. 1987) (emphasis added).
142
See supra text accompanying notes 105–09 (discussing ways in which dual juries lessen
prejudice present in joint trials).
143
See Lebron-Gonzalez, 816 F.2d at 831 (stating in dictum that impaneling dual juries was a
method of “minimizing any prejudice from jointly trying the defendants”).
134
135
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for joinder.
3. The Potential for Confusion
Finally, to the extent that the procedure may infringe upon defendants’
right to a fair trial, courts have expressed concern over potential jury
confusion.144 Juries must know when they are supposed to be in the
courtroom and must only hear evidence admissible against the defendant
for whom they are responsible. Unless specific incidents of confusion can
be identified that are so pervasive as to render the trial unfair, courts affirm
convictions.145
The extent of confusion necessary to warrant reversal is demonstrated
by People v. Brown.146 In Brown, when testifying to the jury and then
again during closing argument, the assistant state’s attorney confused one
defendant’s confession with another defendant’s confession.147 The
prosecutor also referred to portions of a witness’s testimony to a jury that
had not heard that testimony.148 In light of these mistakes, and because the
court found that there was insufficient independent indicia to convict
defendants without the inadmissible evidence, the court found prejudice.149
People v. Brown, however, is an outlier, and generally, instances of
confusion do not rise to the level of reversal. For instance, in Ewish v.
State,150 despite finding that the facts demonstrated how dual juries can
become “a breeding ground for confusion in process and results alike,” any
prejudice resulting from this confusion was insufficient for reversal due to
the overwhelming evidence of guilt.151 In addition, in United States v.
Rimar,152 there were moments of confusion about which jury was to be
present and the judge and defense counsel made misstatements in referring
144
See, e.g., United States v. Rimar, 558 F.2d 1271, 1273 (6th Cir. 1977) (“The primary concern
of this court . . . was whether the unusual procedure implemented in the district court of simultaneous
prosecutions before two juries and the judge created an atmosphere so confusing as to deprive these
appellants of a fair trial.”); People v. Rainge, 445 N.E.2d 535, 551 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (“Issues and
facts before each jury, who testified before which jury, and even which jury is hearing which testimony
can all too easily become confused.” (quoting People v. Williams, No. 51870, slip op. at 4–7 (Ill. Apr.
16, 1982))).
145
See, e.g., People v. Mack, 606 N.E.2d 165, 171 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (finding no indication of
confusion or unfairness in the jury’s decision); People v. Gholston, 464 N.E.2d 1179, 1191 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1984) (“Although we recognize the possibility of confusion inherent in the multiple jury procedure,
we find nothing in the record before us indicative of prejudicial error.”); People v. Church, 429 N.E.2d
577, 585 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (“[W]here there is no confusion which is so pervasive as to render the trial
unfair, even though moments of confusion appear in the record, the two-jury procedure has been
endorsed.”); Scarborough v. State, 437 A.2d 672, 674–75 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981) (finding no
prejudice and thus no merit to defendant’s claim of confusion).
146
624 N.E.2d 1378 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
147
Id. at 1389.
148
Id.
149
Id. at 1390.
150
871 P.2d 306 (Nev. 1994).
151
Id. at 313, 315–16.
152
558 F.2d 1271 (6th Cir. 1977).
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to the attorneys or their clients by incorrect names.
Despite this, the
Sixth Circuit affirmed the defendants’ convictions because most of these
misstatements took place out of the presence of the jury and the judge
promptly corrected himself or the attorney and instructed the jury
accordingly.154 Overall, although courts have acknowledged the potential
for confusion, such worries have rarely come to fruition or warranted
reversal of a defendant’s conviction.
C. Rejection of Defendants’ Arguments
Defendants have frequently challenged courts’ impaneling of multiple
juries, resorting to a wide variety of arguments in an effort to obtain
reversal of their convictions—from the novelty of dual juries to the
potential to jeopardize the right to a fair trial due to one jury sitting on
harder seats than another jury.155 This section explores these arguments
and discusses why courts have generally found that they fail to require
reversal. The overwhelming rejection of defendants’ arguments shows the
strong legal foundation upon which dual juries rest. Accordingly, courts
should recognize and encourage this tested and beneficial legal procedure.
1. Constitutional Arguments
Defendants have made several arguments against dual juries invoking
their constitutional rights. Many defendants have challenged the procedure
on Fourteenth Amendment due process grounds and on the basis that they
have been deprived of their right to a fair trial guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment. Still, no court has held that the use of dual juries is a per se
constitutional violation.156 In fact, the first federal circuit to consider the
procedure held that the defendant “enjoyed each and every right given to
him by the Constitution, the Sixth Amendment, and by rule.”157 In order to
prevail on a constitutional claim, a defendant must show that the use of
dual juries caused a specific due process violation.158 This is generally a
fact-specific analysis and requires the court to consider specific instances
that a defendant can identify that caused him prejudice.
A common challenge is that cross-examination was hindered in some
153

Id. at 1273.
Id.
155
People v. Patterson, 610 N.E.2d 16, 43 (Ill. 1992).
156
See Brown v. Sirmons, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1279 (N.D. Okla. 2006), aff’d 515 F.3d 1072,
1079 (10th Cir. 2008) (collecting cases).
157
United States v. Sidman, 470 F.2d 1158, 1169 (9th Cir. 1972).
158
See United States v. Lewis, 716 F.2d 16, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (“[T]his court’s task is to
determine whether the procedure imposed by the district court comports with the basic norms of due
process . . . . [We must] determin[e] whether any evidence indicates that the procedure specifically
prejudiced a litigant’s defense.”); Hedlund v. Ryan, No. CV 02-110-PHX-DGC, 2009 WL 2432739, at
*11 (D. Ariz. Aug. 10, 2009) (citing cases indicating this requirement).
154
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way.
Still, a generalized allegation of repression will not suffice.160
Additionally, the Arizona district court rejected a challenge to crossexamination when the evidence would have been admissible
notwithstanding the impanelment of dual juries.161 The Tenth Circuit also
found no merit in an argument that the defense attorney did not crossexamine certain witnesses because he did not want to remove the jury for
fear of causing a spectacle.162 The court rejected this argument because the
defendant could identify no specific testimony that could have been
presented but was not.163 On the whole, courts require particular instances
of actual prejudice and defendants generally fail to identify any.
In addition, in support of an alleged constitutional violation,
defendants claim that the procedure created a conflict of interest for their
attorneys. For instance, in Wilson v. Sirmons, in support of his Sixth
Amendment claim, the defendant argued that there was a conflict of
interest by requiring his attorney to inform the court of impending potential
prejudicial testimony.164 The Tenth Circuit rejected this argument since he
cited no specific instances of a conflict.165 The court also reasoned that this
additional obligation on counsel “did not diminish his presence at counsel
table during all stages of the trial, nor did it prevent him from acting as
counsel, as he was free to ask all questions and present all evidence.”166
The court concluded that “[w]hatever minimal obligation he had did not
materially limit his ability zealously to represent Mr. Wilson.”167 An
Oklahoma appellate court also held that requiring one defendant’s counsel
to inform the court when another defendant’s jury needs to be excused did
not rise to the level of a conflict of interest for the attorney.168 One state
court has also upheld a waiver of a conflict of interest made prior to the

159
See Hedlund, 2009 WL 2432739, at *12 (holding that petitioner provided no support for his
allegation that cross-examination was impeded due to dual juries).
160
See id. (rejecting petitioner’s argument that counsel “were forced to tiptoe around various
subjects with two key witnesses . . . because of the risk of Bruton error”); Brown v. Sirmons, 415 F.
Supp. 2d 1268, 1282 (N.D. Okla. 2006) (rejecting defendant’s claim that dual juries stifled crossexamination when defendant failed to identify any specific instances of alleged stifling), aff’d 515 F.3d
1072, 1079 (10th Cir. 2008); Alverson v. State, 983 P.2d 498, 507 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999) (finding
insufficient defendant’s claim that cross-examination was chilled when defendant failed to cite any
specific incidents and no indication was present that cross would have been different without the dual
jury procedure).
161
See, e.g., McKinney v. Ryan, No. CV 03-774-PHX-DGC, 2009 WL 2432738, at *8 (D. Ariz.
Aug. 10, 2009).
162
Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1100 (10th Cir. 2008).
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
Alverson v. State, 983 P.2d 498, 507 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999) (“All Alverson’s lawyer had to
do was ask the court to remove Harjo’s jury if he wanted to proceed along lines which were damaging
to Harjo. This is no way made him an advocate or a co-counsel for Harjo . . . .”).
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169

motion to impanel dual juries.
Similarly, some defendants have made the argument that their counsel
was ineffective. For example, in State v. Avery,170 the defendant appealed
his conviction claiming that his counsel was ineffective because the
attorney did not object to the use of dual juries, since Wisconsin law does
not allow for the procedure.171 The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin
rejected the defendant’s argument, finding that he did not meet the burden
to establish that counsel’s performance was deficient and that prejudice
resulted. According to the appellate court, Wisconsin law does, in fact,
allow dual juries and the trial court meticulously utilized the procedure.172
Another constitutional argument that defendants make is that juries
were so confused that defendants’ due process rights were violated. These
challenges are generally rejected unless specific instances can be identified
showing that there was pervasive confusion that robbed the defendant of a
fair trial.173 Courts examine whether a defendant had as fair a trial using
dual juries as she would have had were she tried alone.174
Finally, some defendants have argued that despite impaneling dual
juries, a Bruton violation still occurred. These—like most other inquiries
of prejudice—are fact-specific and depend on the admissibility of evidence
during the trial. For instance, the First Circuit rejected both codefendants’
claims of Bruton violations because the testimony at issue did not mention
the defendant in question and the judge offered sufficient limiting
instructions.175 In addition, the Supreme Court of Louisiana found no
Bruton violation when one jury discovered a codefendant’s confession
which implicated the defendant for whom they were responsible because
the information could have been admitted without prejudice in a joint
trial.176 Generally, courts also look at whether the defendant objected to
the admission during trial. If there was no objection then the court will not
review the admission.177
2. Authorization
Defendants have also challenged the procedure on the grounds that
courts are not authorized to use dual juries. Courts have overwhelmingly
169

Roberts v. State, 573 So. 2d 964, 964–65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
571 N.W.2d 907 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
171
Id. at 908.
172
Id.
173
See discussion supra Part III.B.3 for courts’ responses to jury confusion claims.
174
See, e.g., Barron v. Renico, No. 04-CV-73788, 2006 WL 1663320, at *8 (E.D. Mich. June 13,
2006) (examining admissibility of evidence presented to determine whether defendant had a fair trial).
175
United States v. Lebron-Gonzalez, 816 F.2d 823, 831 (1st Cir. 1987).
176
State v. Watson, 397 So. 2d 1337, 1340–41 (La. 1981).
177
See, e.g., Probus v. Horel, No. EDCV 09-1470-AG(CT), 2009 WL 5195953, at *6 (C.D. Cal.
Dec. 29, 2009) (“The failure to object at trial is a longstanding appellate procedural bar.”); Woolbright
v. State, 160 S.W.3d 315, 322–23 (Ark. 2004) (affirming defendant’s conviction because he did not
object to the testimony of witnesses during trial).
170
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rejected this argument, whether grounded in lack of statutory authority or
court rules. Courts examine whether there is an express prohibition on the
procedure, and if not, courts hold that they have the authority to impanel
dual juries.178
3. Novelty
Courts reject novelty arguments against the impanelment of dual
juries. For instance, the Ninth Circuit explicitly stated that while the
defendant called the procedure an “experiment,” this did not lend support
to his argument since it did not inform the practice’s reliability.179 In fact,
as other courts have found, new procedures are allowable and may even
lead to improvements.180 Similarly, even though some courts have voiced
criticism of the practice, defendants have been unsuccessful in raising
courts’ disapproval as a valid argument against the procedure. As the
District of Columbia Circuit found, “[t]his court’s task is not to determine
whether the district court made the optimal decision . . . to impanel two
juries . . . . Rather this court’s task is to determine whether the procedure
imposed by the district court comports with the basic norm of due
process.”181 Novelty and popularity are not relevant to this determination.
4. Effect on Juries
Defendants have challenged the effect of dual juries on the juries
themselves, but courts have rejected any speculative arguments about juror
misconduct. For example, in People v. Cummings,182 the court rejected the
defendant’s argument that the use of dual juries led both juries to convict
out of fear that the other jury would not convict and the murderer would go
unpunished.183 In People v. Harris,184 the defendant challenged the dual
jury procedure’s impact on the jury on four grounds:
(1) it is “cumbersome” and causes inconvenience to the
jurors; (2) by increasing the projected duration of the trial,
[it] decreases the number of jurors on the panel from which
the jury is to be selected who are able to serve without
hardship and thus threatens the defendant’s right to a jury
drawn from a representative cross-section of the community;
178
For a more detailed examination of courts’ authority to impanel dual juries, see discussion
supra Part II.A.
179
Lambright v. Stewart, 191 F.3d 1181, 1184–85 (9th Cir. 1999); see also United States v.
Sidman, 470 F.2d 1158, 1168 (9th Cir. 1972) (rejecting the argument that because the dual jury
procedure was novel, it infringed upon the defendant’s rights); Ewish v. State, 871 P.2d 306, 314 (Nev.
1994) (“[N]ovelty alone is not enough to reverse appellants’ respective convictions.”).
180
See supra note 54–55 and accompanying text.
181
United States v. Lewis, 716 F.2d 16, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
182
850 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1993).
183
Id. at 34, 36.
184
767 P.2d 619 (Cal. 1989).
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(3) [it] creates a danger that jurors frustrated by the delay and
inconveniences caused by the procedure will blame the
defendant for their discomfiture; and (4) [it] invites each jury
to speculate that, during the time it is excluded, evidence
damaging to the defendant whose case that jury is trying is
being presented to the second jury.185
All of these arguments were rejected by the court as pure speculation
unsupported by the record.186 Specifically, the court found that jurors were
simply informed when they needed to return to the courtroom, causing no
inconvenience, and that any breaks in the presentation of evidence were
not out of the ordinary.187 The court also declined to speculate about any
potential inferences the jury may have made when it was not in the
courtroom and noted that the jury may not have been aware that the
codefendant’s jury was in session.188 Overwhelmingly, if the record does
not reflect any specific instances of prejudice and the trial judge
meticulously instructed the jury that they are not to speculate, courts will
uphold the use of dual juries.189
5. Courtroom Layout and Juror Accommodations
A common argument by defendants is that the courtroom layout or
accommodations of the jurors was prejudicial. Defendants have advanced
a wide variety of claims in this area, but courts have rejected speculative
claims regarding courtroom configuration. Courts have found no merit in
claims that due process rights were violated due to positioning defendants
facing the jurors thus potentially causing intimidation,190 or by defendants
185

Id. at 633–34.
Id. at 634.
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
See, e.g., Lambright v. Stewart, 191 F.3d 1181, 1186 n.5 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The argument that
each defendant’s jury will ‘necessarily speculate’ about the evidence being heard by the other
defendant’s jury is itself rank speculation” (citing People v. Harris, 767 P.2d 619, 634 (Cal. 1989) (en
banc))); United States v. Lewis, 716 F.2d 16, 20 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (declining to reverse defendant’s
conviction based on defendant’s claim that jurors were speculating about why they had to leave the
courtroom); People v. Patterson, 610 N.E.2d 16, 43 (Ill. 1992) (finding no merit in defendant’s
argument that the jury assumed that the State properly brought charges and that the evidence the jury
was not allowed to hear was related to its defendant); State v. Watson, 397 So. 2d 1337, 1341–42 (La.
1981) (rejecting the contention that the dual jury system caused jurors to speculate whether the other
jury would reach the same conclusion in light of no claim by the defendant that the evidence did not
support the verdict); State v. VanHorn, No. L-98-1171, 2000 WL 234557, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 3,
2000) (finding no merit in defendant’s claim of the possibility of juror speculation); Alverson v. State,
983 P.2d 498, 506–07 (Okla. Crim. App. 1999) (rejecting defendant’s claim that the jury was left to
improperly speculate when it was excused because defendant cited no instances showing prejudice and
the trial judge “painstakingly” instructed the jury about the procedure); Wilson v. State, 983 P.2d 448,
457 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998) (finding no merit in defendant’s argument that the jury speculated
particularly in light of the trial court’s instructions and no indication that the jury did not adhere to
them), aff’d in part and vacated in part by Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1070 (10th Cir. 2008).
190
State v. McKinney, 917 P.2d 1214, 1232 (Ariz. 1996).
186
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being allowed to sit together and referred to as codefendants.
Courts
have also found no error when a defendant’s jury sat closer to the victim’s
family than the codefendant’s jury,192 when only one jury could sit in the
jury box at a given time,193 and when juries were able to observe each
other.194 In addition, one court found meritless an argument that a
defendant’s jury sat on harder seats than his codefendant’s jury.195 Further,
“traffic jams” in the courtroom without any indication of “rowdiness or
breach of decorum” were found not to warrant reversal.196
Some defendants have also advanced arguments rooted in a violation
of their right to a public trial resulting from the juries’ placement in the
courtroom. In the first federal circuit to examine dual juries, the defendant
“hint[ed]” that the procedure robbed him of his right to a public trial
because space outside the jury box was occupied by jurors.197 The Ninth
Circuit rejected this argument, however, because the jury was within the
space reserved for counsel and “did not in the slightest encroach on any
space reserved for the public.”198 Still, later courts upheld convictions
when jurors sit in the audience.199 Further, in 1972, the Ninth Circuit
stated that the argument of encroachment might gain legitimacy if three or
four juries were present in the courtroom.200 Since then, however, courts
have upheld the impaneling of three juries and a dual-trial four-jury
procedure.201
Accordingly, defendants have not been successful in challenging the
dual jury procedure. Courts have not held the procedure to be inherently
prejudicial, and overwhelmingly, courts have not found it to be executed
prejudicially. After nearly four decades of affirming convictions, courts
191

People v. Trice, 577 N.E.2d 1195, 1203 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
Wilson, 983 P.2d at 458.
193
People v. Wardlow, 173 Cal. Rptr. 500, 502 (Ct. App. 1981); see also People v. Brooks, 285
N.W.2d 307, 308 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (rejecting defendant’s challenge of the dual jury procedure
based on the seating of one of the juries outside the jury box because “there is nothing sacrosanct in the
placement of the jury in the jury box”).
194
Brooks, 285 N.W.2d at 308–09.
195
People v. Patterson, 610 N.E.2d 16, 43 (Ill. 1992).
196
Brooks, 285 N.W.2d at 308–09.
197
United States v. Sidman, 470 F.2d 1158, 1170 (9th Cir. 1972).
198
Id.
199
See People v. Harris, 767 P.2d 619, 630, 637 (Cal. 1989) (en banc) (finding no prejudice when
one jury was seated in the jury box and one jury was in seats normally reserved for the audience and
the juries switched locations each week); State v. Watson, 397 So. 2d 1337, 1339 n.2 (La. 1981)
(finding no prejudice when one jury was seated in the jury box while the other jury was seated in the
front row of the courtroom).
200
Sidman, 470 F.2d at 1170.
201
People v. Knight, 486 N.E.2d 1356, 1361 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (finding no violation of
defendant’s rights from a triple-jury trial); State v. Bowman, 588 A.2d 728, 732, 734 (Me. 1991)
(finding proper discretion for trial court to use dual-trial four-jury procedure); Ewish v. State, 871 P.2d
306, 316 (Nev. 1994) (finding no prejudice from the three-jury procedure); State v. Hernandez, 394
A.2d 883, 885 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978) (finding no prejudice from the impaneling of three
separate juries).
192
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should recognize the solid legal foundation upon which dual juries rest. To
provide further legal support for the procedure, the next Part proposes
detailed model guidelines that jurisdictions should adopt to help ensure that
dual juries continue to be implemented efficiently and justly.
IV. MODEL GUIDELINES FOR IMPANELING MULTIPLE
JURIES IN JOINT TRIALS
Since the Ninth Circuit upheld the dual jury procedure almost forty
years ago, there have been many calls for guidelines, including by the
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Sidman.202 Only a few limited sources
have suggested any guidance for trial courts.203 For example, in 1997, the
Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma adopted the following guidelines
for impaneling dual juries:
Guideline 2. Impaneling Dual Juries.
In a case where co-defendants are charged, the trial court
may, at its discretion, order two juries impaneled, one for
each co-defendant. Both juries will be seated in the jury box
and the evidence pertaining to both defendants will be
presented to both juries simultaneously. Evidence admissible
as to one co-defendant shall be presented to that defendant’s
jury only.
Comment: This procedure is intended to balance, in
appropriate cases, defendants’ rights to separate trials and
speedy trials, and concerns of fairness and judicial
economy.204
Although these guidelines are a good starting point, they are brief and
202
470 F.2d 1158, 1170 (9th Cir. 1972) (“Although we uphold the trial by two juries in this case,
we think that unless some guidelines are established by court rule at the District Court level . . . our
holding is not to be read as an endorsement of the ‘experiment’ that was carried out in this case.”); see
also Woolbright v. State, 160 S.W.3d 315, 324–25 (Ark. 2004) (“[W]e condemn the practice and
prohibit the use of dual juries until such time as a rule has been implemented to specifically address the
practical considerations necessary for safeguarding the defendants’ rights.”); Watson, 397 So. 2d at
1342 (discouraging dual juries until guidelines are incorporated into Louisiana’s Code of Criminal
Procedure); Ewish, 871 P.2d at 316 (“Without guidelines authorized by this court or sanction from our
state’s legislature, the courts of this state are instructed to refrain from conducting [multiple jury] trials
in this manner.”); Hernandez, 394 A.2d at 886 (suggesting that dual juries be studied by a committee of
the state supreme court); State v. Dellinger, 79 S.W.3d 458, 468 (Tenn. 2002) (“We do not condone the
practice in Tennessee at this time when no rule has been implemented to specifically address the
practical considerations necessary for safeguarding defendants’ rights under the multiple jury
procedure.”).
203
For a discussion of potential guidelines, see Hedlund v. Sheldon, 840 P.2d 1008, 1011–13
(Ariz. 1992); Gaynes, supra note 17, at 291–92; Hersh, supra note 17, at 73–74; Robert E. Larsen,
NAVIGATING THE FEDERAL TRIAL § 3:42 (2010); Note, Richardson v. Marsh, supra note 17, at 1893
n.99.
204
Cohee v. State, 942 P.2d 211, 213 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997).
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do not address the myriad issues with which a trial judge may have to
contend.205 The following proposed guidelines are meant to be applicable
to any jurisdiction that wishes to have detailed procedural safeguards to
ensure that judicial economy is preserved without compromising
defendants’ constitutional rights. Such guidelines may be incorporated
into a district court’s rules or a state’s code of criminal procedure.
A. Guidelines for Impaneling Multiple Juries in Joint Trials
This court/code recognizes that in the interest of judicial economy and
to avoid unnecessary duplication and expenditure of the court’s resources,
multiple juries may be impaneled. Such a procedure, however, must meet
the dual goals of conserving court resources and preserving defendants’
constitutionally protected rights. At all times, the court must remember
that justice takes priority over judicial economy.206
In order to assess whether a multiple jury procedure is appropriate for
a case, the judge must try to determine how much of the evidence against
the defendants overlaps. A significant majority of the evidence should be
common to the defendants.207 Further, with the assistance of counsel, the
judge should attempt to estimate how many times each jury must be
excluded from the courtroom.208 Excessive removal may negate any time
saving advantages of the procedure and could lead to confusion.
1. Voir Dire
There should be a separate and perhaps mutually exclusive voir dire
for each jury.209 The defendant and the defendant’s counsel should be
present throughout the selection of his jury. Any codefendants should only
be present briefly to ensure that no jurors on any jury know the
defendants.210 Any jurors who are selected to serve on the first jury should
be excused while selection of the remaining juries is completed. During
205
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma, which adopted the guidelines just a year earlier,
remarked in 1998 that “[v]ery little guidance was given to trial courts in the implementation of [dual
juries].” Wilson v. State, 983 P.2d 448, 456 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998), aff’d in part and vacated in part
by Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1070 (10th Cir. 2008).
206
United States v. Rowan, 518 F.2d 685, 690 (6th Cir. 1975) (“[J]ustice, not judicial economy, is
the first principle of our legal system.” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Crane, 499 F.2d
1385, 1388 (6th Cir. 1974))).
207
For a list of cases in which the court noted the importance of substantial overlap in the
evidence against all defendants, see supra note 93.
208
People v. Harris, 767 P.2d 619, 632–33 (Cal. 1989) (en banc) (noting that one jury was
removed three times while the other jury was excused five times); Santagata, supra note 17, at 32
(noting that this is a “crucial determination” and that in People v. Ricardo B., the juries were excused
eleven times).
209
See Hedlund v. Sheldon, 840 P.2d 1008, 1011 (Ariz. 1992); Hersh, supra note 17, at 73; Note,
Richardson v. Marsh, supra note 17, at 1893 n.99; cf. People v. Hana, 524 N.W.2d 682, 697 (Mich.
1994) (finding no prejudice where a single jury venire was used).
210
Hedlund, 840 P.2d at 1012.
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the voir dire, the judge should explain that there will be more than one
defendant on trial but that each jury will be responsible for the
determination of the guilt or innocence of only one defendant. The jury is
not to consider or speculate on the guilt or innocence of any other
defendant. During the trial, each jury may be excused and should not
speculate about the reasons for removal.211 The judge should ask each
prospective juror whether there is anything about this procedure that would
hinder his or her ability to follow the judge’s instructions.212
Separation of the venires is particularly important when defendants are
presenting antagonistic defenses.213 Great care must be taken to avoid
exposing one defendant’s jury to the antagonistic defense of another
codefendant.
2. Explanation to the Jury
Each jury should receive separate explanations as to the procedure
prior to the start of the trial. Each should be informed whose guilt or
innocence it is charged with determining. The juries should be told that
they will not be present at all times in the courtroom but that they are not to
speculate as to why they are excused or about evidence presented while
they are gone.214 They should also be told to carefully adhere to any
instruction that the judge provides and not to draw any inferences from the
fact that the defendants are seated at one table.215 The judge should also
explain to them why the court is conducting the procedure, particularly that
it will save the court time and money.
3. Opening and Closing Statements
Each jury should be given separate opening statements.216 Closing
statements may be separate or together depending on whether or not
counsel plans to reference evidence inadmissible against one defendant.217
No references to other defendants should be made. Counsel and the judge
must ensure that counsel does not mention evidence inadmissible to the
defendant or that was not presented to that defendant’s jury.

211
See, e.g., Brown v. Sirmons, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1281–82 (N.D. Okla. 2006), aff’d 515 F.3d
1072, 1079 (10th Cir. 2008).
212
Santagata, supra note 17, at 32; see also Wilson v. State, 983 P.2d 448, 457 (Okla. Crim. App.
1998) (noting that trial court explicitly asked both juries if they could assure the court that they would
not infer or speculate about what evidence is being presented while outside the courtroom), aff’d in part
and vacated in part by Wilson v. Sirmons, 536 F.3d 1064, 1070 (10th Cir. 2008).
213
Hana, 524 N.W.2d at 709 (Levin, J., dissenting).
214
Hedlund, 840 P.2d at 1012.
215
People v. Trice, 577 N.E.2d 1195, 1203 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that defendant was not
prejudiced by sitting at the same table as his codefendant at trial); Santagata, supra note 17, at 32.
216
See, e.g., Hedlund, 840 P.2d at 1012.
217
Hersh, supra note 17, at 74.
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4. Exhibits
Each jury should receive a copy of the exhibits admissible against their
defendant.218 This will decrease the chances that one jury will speculate
about the deliberations of the other.219 Any exhibits that are not capable of
duplication should be distributed between the juries per request and
discretion of the trial judge.
5. Presentation of Evidence
A jury should only be present in the courtroom if the evidence
presented is admissible against its defendant. As a result, the trial court
and counsel must do their best to predict when inadmissible evidence will
be presented against one defendant in order to excuse that defendant’s jury
prior to the admission of this evidence. The ideal procedure is for the
judge to review with counsel which jury—or juries—to bring back to the
courtroom prior to calling the next witness.220 Although this is an extra
burden on defense counsel and the trial court judge,221 if each is vigilant
and takes extra care to anticipate lines of questioning, each jury should
only hear the evidence that it is permitted to hear. If inadmissible evidence
is presented by accident in front of a defendant’s jury, the trial judge must
determine whether the error is capable of being corrected through
instruction, and, if appropriate, provide the jury with a proper limiting
instruction.222 Ultimately, the discretion rests with the trial judge. The
goal is to ensure that the evidence against one defendant is the same in the
joint trial as if he or she would have had a trial alone.223
6. Direct Examination and Cross-Examination
Normal direct examination should occur unless evidence requires
otherwise.224 The trial judge has the discretion to hold direct examination
separately for each defendant or to allow all juries to be present. Of
course, a jury must be excused if any evidence inadmissible against its
defendant is about to be presented.225 The court and attorneys should also
218
Hedlund, 840 P.2d at 1012; Gaynes, supra note 17, at 291; Gary Muldoon, Dual (Multiple)
Jury Trials May Be Held, HANDLING A CRIM. CASE IN N.Y. § 14:19 (2009).
219
Gaynes, supra note 17, at 291.
220
State v. Avery, 571 N.W.2d 907, 910 (Wis. 1997) (“Prior to resuming testimony and before
bringing the panels into the courtroom, the court reviewed with counsel whether both or only one panel
should be brought in for the next witness.”).
221
See discussion supra Part III.B.1.
222
See, e.g., United States v. Rimar, 558 F.2d 1271, 1273 (6th Cir. 1977) (noting that the trial
judge instructed the jury accordingly when misstatements occurred during defendant’s dual jury trial
and thus the trial was not unfair).
223
See People v. Smith, 419 N.E.2d 404, 409 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (finding no prejudice when
defendant was “given every opportunity to present a complete defense before one jury, coterminous
with what would have attached had there been no co-defendant”).
224
Hedlund v. Sheldon, 840 P.2d 1008, 1012 (Ariz. 1992).
225
See discussion supra Part II.D (discussing the Bruton problem).
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be aware of antagonistic defenses. During cross-examination, only the jury
of the defendant whose case it pertains to, whether just one defendant or all
defendants, should be present.226
7. Errors
If any error occurs during the proceedings, the judge must use his or
her discretion to determine whether such error may be corrected with
proper limiting instruction227 or if a mistrial is necessary.228 Examples of
such errors include bringing the wrong jury back into the courtroom;
counsel, the trial court judge, or a witness calling the defendant by a
codefendant’s name; or presentation of evidence in front of a defendant’s
jury that is inadmissible against that defendant.
8. Repeated Admonishments
It is essential that the trial judge repeat the instructions to the jury of its
role in the proceeding. The judge must continually remind the jury that it
must only consider the guilt or innocence of its defendant; that even though
all defendants will be in the courtroom, the jury may draw no inference
regarding an association between them; and that no speculation must be
made regarding the reasons for removal or any other aspect of the
procedure. It is hard to imagine that such instructions could ever be
excessively repeated.229
9. Court Reporter
The court reporter should, to the extent possible, keep separate records
of the proceedings and must note which jury or juries are present.230
10. Jury Instructions
It is within the trial judge’s discretion to hold joint jury instructions, in
whole or in part, if he or she determines it will comport with defendants’
226
People v. Leak, 925 N.E.2d 264, 292 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (noting that cross-examination of the
State’s witness was conducted separately); Hersh, supra note 17, at 74 (asserting that “[t]he better
practice, especially when a defense attorney seeks to emphasize greater culpability of a codefendant,
would be for only the cross-examining defendant’s jury to be present”).
227
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968) (“It is not unreasonable to conclude that in
many such cases [in which inadmissible evidence is admitted] the jury can and will follow the trial
judge’s instructions to disregard such information.”).
228
Id. (“[T]here are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow
instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and
human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored.”); see also State v. Padilla, 964 P.2d 829, 833
(N.M. Ct. App. 1998) (noting that the trial court informed the State that the defendant would receive a
mistrial if any inadmissible statements were heard by the defendant’s jury).
229
People v. Irizarry, 634 N.E.2d 179, 181 (N.Y. 1994) (indicating that the trial judge repeated
over twenty times the instructions that the jury was not to gain knowledge of the other jury’s activities
and to avoid contact with each other).
230
State v. Avery, 571 N.W.2d 907, 910 (Wis. 1997).
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rights.
Defendants should not be referred to together in the jury
instructions, either by the use of “and/or” or other words or phrases that
would link them together. Jurors should be informed that they should
consider all evidence as a whole but must remember what evidence is
applicable to their defendant. The juries should again be reminded not to
speculate about reasons for their removal from the courtroom and that they
are required adhere to all instructions given throughout the trial.
11. Jury Sequestration
All juries should be sequestered from one another,232 with separate jury
rooms and separate restrooms designated for each jury.233 Lunch should be
at different times. Jurors should be instructed not to contact any jurors
from other juries even in passing. Each jury should also be labeled to
reduce the likelihood of confusing them. They may wear labeled or
colored badges.234 A single court officer should be assigned to each jury
and should stay with the jury whenever the judge or counsel is absent from
the courtroom.235
Each jury may also be sequestered to prevent exposure to media
coverage about evidence against codefendants.236 This is particularly
important in highly publicized cases.
12. Courtroom Layout and Jury Accommodations
Accommodating multiple juries in one courtroom can often be
challenging. Ideally, each jury would have its own jury box, but
courtroom facilities do not always allow for this opportunity. The goal
should be to ensure that each jury has as adequate a view of the witnesses
and defendants as the other jury or juries. If two jury boxes are
unavailable, other feasible options include: (1) one jury seated in the jury
box and the other seated in chairs in front of237 or perpendicular238 to the
jury box or (2) one jury seated in the jury box and one jury in seats
231
Compare Irizarry, 634 N.E.2d at 181 (noting that juries were instructed separately with regard
to charges and defenses for each defendant), with People v. Ricardo B., 535 N.E.2d 1336, 1337 (N.Y.
1989) (noting that one charge was given to both juries without the use of either defendant’s name).
232
Cf. People v. Rainge, 445 N.E.2d 535, 550 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (finding no indication of
impropriety even though the juries were not sequestered during trial); Scarborough v. State, 437 A.2d
672, 675 n.1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981) (finding no reversible error when juries stayed in the same jury
room except during final deliberation since trial judge specifically instructed jurors not to speak to one
another).
233
Avery, 571 N.W.2d at 910.
234
United States v. Hayes, 676 F.2d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir. 1982); Larsen, supra note 203;
Muldoon, supra note 218; Santagata, supra note 17, at 32.
235
Irizarry, 634 N.E.2d at 181.
236
Avery, 571 N.W.2d at 910.
237
United States v. Sidman, 470 F.2d 1158, 1168 (9th Cir. 1972).
238
Santagata, supra note 17; see also id. (providing a diagram of the courtroom layout in People
v. Ricardo B., 535 N.E.2d 1336, 1339 (N.Y. 1989)).
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otherwise used by the audience. If the latter option is selected, the court
must ensure that the jury in public seating does not occupy excessive space
such that the defendant’s right to a public trial is infringed.240 The juries
should switch places every other day or at an interval that the trial judge
determines is appropriate.241
13. Verdict
Each jury renders its own verdict and verdicts should be sealed until all
are reached.242 This is particularly important in highly publicized cases.
The jury rendering a verdict first may be sequestered until the remaining
verdict(s) are reached. Alternatively, they may be excused and advised
that they may not reveal anything about the verdict until such time that the
court contacts them rescinding the order.
V. CONCLUSION
This Note has examined dual juries in joint trials. It has endorsed the
procedure and provided detailed model guidelines. Dual juries have been
consistently used for over forty years, yet courts continually refer to the
procedure as novel and caution against its use. Instances of prejudice that
courts fear so deeply have materialized in only a handful of cases, while
the vast majority of dual jury joint trials have gone relatively smoothly.
Indeed, the use of dual juries allows joint trials even when all the evidence
is not admissible against all defendants, thus preventing needless
duplication of evidence and excessive expenditures of time and money.
The trial judge is the most important aspect to impaneling a dual jury.
It is within the judge’s power and responsibility to properly advise the jury
of its role so that the defendants are not prejudiced by the procedure. The
judge, as well as counsel, must be vigilant throughout the trial in order to
guard against any potentially prejudicial evidence. These burdens increase
as the amount of independent evidence against each defendant increases.
Accordingly, the benefits of dual juries are only realized if there is
substantial overlap between the evidence against all defendants. When this
condition is met, however, and counsel as well as the judge have
cooperated in ensuring a fair trial, dual juries have proven to be not only
239
People v. Harris, 767 P.2d 619, 630 (Cal. 1989) (en banc); State v. Watson, 397 So. 2d 1337,
1339 n.2 (La. 1981).
240
See supra text accompanying notes 197–201 (discussing defendants’ arguments about
infringement of right to a public trial from impaneling dual juries).
241
See, e.g., Hedlund v. Sheldon, 840 P.2d 1008, 1012 (Ariz. 1992) (noting in trial procedures
that “juries will switch places every other day”); Harris, 767 P.2d at 630 (noting that juries changed
positions every week); Note, Richardson v. Marsh, supra note 17, at 1893 n.99 (suggesting that juries’
“positions should be rotated regularly to avoid disadvantaging one”).
242
Hersh, supra note 17, at 74; cf. People v. Irizarry, 634 N.E.2d 179, 182–83 (N.Y. 1994)
(holding that failure to seal verdict of first jury until second jury returned verdict was not reversible
error).
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workable, but valuable. Hopefully, with the benefits outlined and the
detailed model guidelines provided in this Note, more courts will take
advantage of this sensible and beneficial innovation.

